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Open resourceCompressed air criticality begins with the consequence of losing usable air at a named process connection. The required service is a combination of flow, pressure, air quality and continuity over time. A spare compressor addresses only some failure scenarios. This worksheet connects the process consequence to a documented service requirement, then checks whether generation, treatment, distribution, controls and recovery arrangements can support that requirement.
Its output is a justified planning decision with an evidence trail. A numerical score helps compare priorities; it does not certify safety, prove availability or create a supplier response guarantee.
1 Define the service before scoring the equipment
Start with a functional statement such as maintaining the specified air supply to a packaging line valve island during the agreed compressor outage. Identify the physical measurement point and the operating state. A compressor discharge gauge cannot establish the pressure available after a dryer, filters, a distribution branch and a local regulator. Likewise, a compressor capacity rating does not establish the flow that remains available while other consumers are running.
Write the process function in language that operations can verify. Record what the air does, what happens when the supply deteriorates, how the process detects the event, and what action follows. Include the minimum service needed for controlled shutdown if normal production cannot continue. A function that protects a safe shutdown may require less flow than normal operation while demanding a more dependable supply path.
Allocate one record to each materially different consequence and supply boundary. Combining workshop tools, control valves and product-contact blow-off into one plant score hides decisions. They may share a compressor station, but their tolerable interruptions, quality requirements and recovery routes can differ substantially. A plant summary should consolidate the individual records without erasing the highest-consequence dependency.
2 Separate consequence from likelihood and present condition
Consequence describes what happens if the required function is lost. Likelihood describes how probable a defined failure is during a stated exposure period. Equipment condition provides evidence that may change the likelihood or the time available to intervene. These are related concepts, but they answer different questions. A new compressor can support a highly critical process; a deteriorated compressor can serve a low-consequence workshop.
Record failure likelihood separately when there is a defensible basis, such as observed events, comparable service history or an applicable reliability model. Do not convert a condition alarm directly into a consequence score. Conversely, a clean inspection report does not lower the consequence of losing instrument air.
Record the failure mode as well as the asset. Loss of compression, contaminated delivery, failure to start on demand and an uncontrolled pressure deviation may have different effects. A whole-machine reliability figure can conceal the failure mode that matters to the process. For investment screening, show both the consequence classification and the evidence supporting the relevant failure scenario.
3 Establish the operating envelope
Define normal operation, startup, changeover, degraded operation, controlled shutdown and restart. The critical demand may vary between these states. Valve movements during a trip may coincide even when normal operation shows little demand. Restarting several production areas together can create a transient that a steady-state survey misses. The worksheet must identify which state determines the service requirement.
Record flow units and reference conditions explicitly. A reference-volume flow cannot be added to a local compressed-volume flow without conversion. Pressure entries must state gauge or absolute pressure and the measurement location. Air-quality entries should identify the property, required limit, sample location and applicable operating conditions. An unspecified phrase such as dry air cannot establish acceptance.
For each requirement, distinguish a process minimum from a preferred operating target and an equipment limit. The operating target may include a justified allowance for control variation or distribution loss. The maximum equipment limit remains a separate constraint and must not be obscured by continuity calculations.
4 Identify the failure scenarios that drive the decision
Choose credible scenarios through a site review that includes operations, maintenance, process engineering and the owners of relevant utilities. Compressor outage is one scenario. Others include dryer failure, loss of the common power supply, unavailable cooling, contamination entering a header, a control-system fault, or a maintenance isolation that removes the only usable route to a critical consumer.
State the scope and duration of each scenario. Losing one compressor while the electrical supply remains healthy is different from losing the entire compressor room. A repair that requires draining a common header may interrupt more users than the original machine fault. Avoid assuming that all healthy equipment is accessible, connectable and permitted to operate during the incident.
Separate credible design cases from sensitivity cases. A sensitivity case explores uncertainty or a more demanding combination without asserting that it is the contractual design basis. Keep the reason for inclusion visible. This permits an engineer to challenge assumptions without turning every hypothetical event into a mandatory capital project.
5 Build the consequence record
Describe production effects in operational terms: stopped line, reduced throughput, delayed maintenance, scrapped work in progress, or an extended restart. Quantify lost output only where the production owner can establish the relationship. Lost gross sales and lost contribution are different measures; the economic model must state which is used and avoid counting the same loss twice.
Describe product effects independently. Pressure loss may leave incomplete movements, poor coating, unsealed packs or an uncontrolled process condition. Air-quality failure may affect material already produced before an alarm becomes visible. The record should identify the affected population, the detection method and the product-disposition owner. A short interruption can therefore create a longer quality investigation.
Safety and environmental consequences require responsible site assessment. It cannot determine safety integrity, replace a hazard study or approve a protection function. Any unresolved severe consequence remains an explicit hold on the relevant engineering decision, irrespective of the arithmetic score.
6 Use a local scoring scale with defined anchors
A five-level scale is convenient for discussion, but its labels are a local planning convention. Define the meaning of each level before scoring. Financial boundaries, interruption durations and product-loss thresholds should be supplied by the organization. A small site and a continuous-process facility may reasonably use different thresholds for the same label.
The following anchors describe increasing consequence without inventing monetary or time limits. The responsible team should replace qualitative terms with approved local definitions where the evidence permits. Record the version of the scale used so that scores from different periods remain interpretable.
Level | Consequence anchor | Evidence needed |
|---|---|---|
1 | Local inconvenience with an accepted alternative | Work method and alternative availability |
2 | Recoverable local delay or limited rework | Operations estimate and recovery steps |
3 | Material line disruption or batch exposure | Production record and quality assessment |
4 | Major operational interruption or difficult recovery | Process review and documented consequence |
5 | Severe consequence requiring explicit escalation | Responsible owner assessment and action record |
Keep separate criteria for production, product integrity, financial exposure and recovery complexity. Record safety or environmental escalation independently rather than relying on its contribution to an average. A score without a written rationale is incomplete, even if the worksheet can technically calculate a number.
7 Calculate the score without overstating its meaning
For scored criteria, let s_i be the criterion score and w_i its disclosed non-negative weight. The weighted screening score is S = sum(w_i × s_i) / sum(w_i), provided the sum of weights is positive. Equal weights produce an arithmetic average. The result is a prioritisation aid based on ordinal judgments, not a measured physical quantity or a probability of failure.
Display the individual scores, weights and rationales alongside the result. A value shown to several decimal places suggests more precision than the inputs support. Two decimal places can help reproduce the calculation, but the decision should explain meaningful differences rather than treating 3.49 and 3.50 as inherently different engineering conditions.
Do not map the score to a criticality class until the organization has defined and approved the mapping. No universal boundary is implied. If no mapping is configured, display the calculated screening score and the narrative consequence classification separately.
8 Preserve overriding consequences
Averaging can hide a dominant consequence. Four low scores cannot cancel an unresolved severe safety or product-integrity issue. The worksheet therefore includes an escalation field with the triggering scenario, accountable owner, required analysis and current disposition. This field remains visible on the summary and exported record even when the numerical score is low.
The escalation is not an automatic claim that a particular redundancy architecture is necessary. It means that the ordinary prioritisation score is insufficient to close the decision. The responsible assessment may require an independent utility, a different process design, protection during shutdown, or another measure outside the compressor station.
A completed consequence review can also justify a simpler solution. If the process can safely stop, product is protected, restart is straightforward and the interruption is acceptable, dedicated standby may offer little value. The worksheet should document that reasoning as carefully as a decision to install additional equipment.
9 Write the service level as a measurable requirement
A useful service-level statement names the consumer boundary, operating state, minimum delivered flow, permitted pressure range, air-quality requirements, tolerable interruption and recovery objective. It also states how compliance will be measured. The statement must distinguish continuous service from intermittent duty and identify any permitted load shedding or degraded production mode.
Avoid using response time as a substitute for restoration time. A telephone response, technician dispatch, arrival at site, fault diagnosis, replacement installation and return to accepted production are separate milestones. A service arrangement that commits to one milestone does not automatically commit to all the others. The worksheet should preserve the wording and scope of any actual agreement.
A measurable requirement includes the conditions under which it applies. Ambient temperature, utility availability, access constraints, the permitted failure scenario and the required measurement duration may affect the result. Store these assumptions with the service-level record rather than hiding them in unrelated meeting notes.
10 Align tolerable interruption and recovery objectives
The maximum tolerable interruption describes the time before the agreed unacceptable consequence occurs. The recovery objective describes the planned time to restore the specified service. The recovery plan must fit within the tolerable interruption, including verification and any process restart needed before the function is genuinely available again.
Define the start and stop event for each clock. A clock beginning at fault detection excludes any undetected deterioration before the alarm. A clock ending when the compressor starts excludes pressure stabilisation, air-quality verification and process release. If different clocks are useful, name them explicitly and show their relationship.
Use a recovery sequence with dependencies. Some tasks can occur in parallel, such as arranging access while a spare is being transported. Other tasks cannot, such as final acceptance before installation. A simple sum of every task may overstate elapsed time; selecting only the longest individual task may understate it. The planning model should identify the critical sequence and the evidence for each duration.
11 Separate service restoration from production restoration
Compressed air may be restored before production can restart. A line may need homing, cleaning, checks on incomplete work, or quality approval. This avoids a misleading comparison between an air supplier milestone and a plant business requirement.
The restart sequence can also increase air demand. A temporary compressor that supports an idle line may not support simultaneous actuator resets, purge sequences and production ramp-up. Agree a staged restart if the available service cannot support the full transient. Record who controls the sequence and how the permitted state is communicated to operators.
Any assumptions about avoiding scrap or maintaining product quality require the responsible process owner. A utility calculation cannot determine the disposition of affected product. Keep the utility acceptance and product release as separate sign-offs, with the relevant evidence attached to each.
12 Determine critical demand from operating states
Build a consumer schedule showing each load, its flow basis, duty pattern and required status during each failure scenario. Critical demand is the sum of loads required to remain active at the relevant instant, plus explicitly justified associated demands. Do not apply a generic diversity factor to a group that may operate simultaneously during shutdown or restart.
Where demand varies, use a time profile or defined state sequence. An average over a shift does not describe a short peak that causes pressure collapse. Conversely, adding every nameplate demand continuously may overstate the service requirement. Use measured operating evidence where available and identify estimates that need validation.
Account for treatment consumption at the boundary where it occurs. If a compressor delivers reference flow upstream of an adsorption dryer, some of that supply may serve regeneration rather than the critical consumer. If a measured delivered-flow value is already downstream of treatment, subtracting the same consumption again would double count it. Every calculation needs a simple boundary description.
13 Create a load shedding schedule that can be executed
Classify each consumer as retain, reduce, shed or separately supply for the defined event. State the method of shedding and its time to take effect. A spreadsheet entry does not remove a load; an operator action, isolation arrangement or control sequence must do so. If that action is unavailable during the incident, the capacity assessment must reflect the actual remaining demand.
Consumer group | Proposed event state | Condition to confirm |
|---|---|---|
Process control devices | Retain the defined protective function | Fail-state and shutdown sequence agreed |
Selected production line | Retain or reduce by approved sequence | Minimum productive and restart demand known |
Workshop tools | Shed when authorised | Isolation accessible and work impact accepted |
Nonessential blow-off | Restrict or shed | Product and machinery consequences checked |
Special pressure user | Separate supply or planned stop | No unintended dependence on common header |
Priorities must be understandable during an incident. Use plant identifiers and physical isolation references that match drawings and labels. Test the sequence under an approved procedure before relying on it. Review the schedule whenever a new consumer is connected, because an unrecorded branch can consume the capacity reserved for protected loads.
14 Calculate firm capacity for each scenario
Firm capacity is the usable supply that remains after the defined outage, under the applicable site and operating conditions. Start from verified equipment performance at the required pressure and correct reference basis. Exclude equipment unavailable for maintenance, incompatible with the temporary arrangement, or dependent on a failed common utility.
Calculate the flow margin as usable firm capacity minus critical delivered demand, with treatment and other losses represented consistently. A positive margin supports only the flow part of the review. It does not prove pressure at the consumer, air quality, acceptable changeover time or availability of the distribution path.
Report uncertainty and operating limits separately. If measured flow uncertainty or unresolved duty variation can change the sign of the margin, state that the capacity conclusion is sensitive to those inputs. Do not add an arbitrary universal percentage and call the uncertainty resolved. Obtain better evidence or justify a project-specific allowance.
15 Check pressure during the actual event
Pressure loss increases with flow and depends on the installed path. An alternate route can have different hose lengths, couplings, valves, treatment components and regulators from the normal route. Evaluate the critical consumer pressure during the required event state, including the transfer transient and the flow through shared sections.
Use an explicit pressure budget that starts with the minimum available supply condition and identifies losses to the consumer. A static pressure check with no demand cannot validate dynamic performance. Equally, raising the compressor setpoint may exceed equipment limits or increase other losses without correcting a local restriction.
Define instrumentation locations before the test. Synchronized measurements at the supply, treatment outlet and critical point help distinguish insufficient generation from a restricted path. Where fast transients matter, the recording interval must resolve the event; a slow trend may show a harmless average while missing a brief process-disrupting dip.
16 Carry air quality through the continuity assessment
A compressor standby arrangement can maintain pressure while failing the air-quality requirement. Record the availability of cooling, moisture separation, drying, filtration, drains and monitoring through each contingency path. A treatment bypass is an alternate flow route; it is not proof of acceptable air quality.
For each required quality property, identify how it will be verified and whether the method detects the relevant excursion quickly enough. A pressure dew-point signal addresses moisture under its stated sampling conditions. It does not establish particle or oil performance. Where contamination has entered distribution, restoring treatment may not immediately restore the downstream system.
The contingency plan should define what happens to affected product or process exposure while quality status is uncertain. That decision belongs to the relevant process owner.
17 Review common dependencies and maintenance configurations
Draw the service chain from energy supply to the consumer. Identify components shared by nominally redundant routes, including switchgear, ventilation, cooling, controls, treatment, manifolds and isolation points. Two installed machines may fail together because they occupy the same overheated room or depend on one unavailable feeder.
Maintenance can create temporary common dependencies. A standby compressor may be isolated while the duty machine is running, or a shared valve may need closing to replace a filter. Evaluate the configuration that exists during planned work as well as the normal configuration. Record how the plant manages the period of reduced resilience.
Dependency | Scenario to examine | Evidence for closure |
|---|---|---|
Electrical supply | Loss of a shared feeder | Confirmed supply topology and recovery arrangement |
Treatment | Dryer unavailable or contaminated | Qualified alternate treatment path |
Controls | Supervisory controller fails | Tested local fallback and authority limits |
Cooling or ventilation | Site condition prevents operation | Thermal assessment and available alternative |
Distribution | Common isolation removes both feeds | Verified drawings and isolation test |
Personnel and access | Required intervention cannot begin | Training, access and escalation records |
18 Choose an architecture from the service requirement
Duty and standby arrangements can be appropriate where a defined standby unit can assume the required load. Modular arrangements can provide flexibility when several combinations meet demand. N+1 describes an equipment-count or capacity philosophy only after N and the required duty have been defined. It is not a complete service guarantee.
Compare architectures on their ability to meet the scenario-specific service envelope. Include treatment, utilities, controls and maintenance access. A larger standby machine may require a supply connection that is unavailable during the incident. Multiple smaller machines may share a vulnerability that defeats the apparent benefit of additional units.
A lower-consequence process may justify planned repair with a tested temporary-air option. A process with a very short tolerable interruption may require automatic local protection or independent service continuity. The decision should follow consequence, practical recovery and lifecycle cost, with the assumptions stated.
19 Treat receiver storage as a finite bridge
A receiver can bridge a short demand deficit while pressure falls through a permitted range. It does not create continuous generation capacity. The usable interval depends on receiver volume, absolute pressure change, temperature behaviour, the reference conditions used for flow and the net demand deficit during the event.
For an illustrative isothermal ideal-gas estimate, usable reference volume is V_r × (P_high,abs minus P_low,abs) / P_ref × T_ref / T_receiver. Divide by the net reference-flow deficit to estimate time. The pressure floor must protect the consumer after distribution losses. If the deficit changes during the event, integrate the time-dependent balance instead of using one constant value.
Rapid discharge can cool the stored air; restrictions and control response also affect delivered service. The simplified estimate is therefore a screening calculation with declared assumptions. Do not use this relation to design a pressure vessel or set protective devices.
20 Define temporary air readiness as an interface
A temporary-air option needs a duty specification, a connectable and rated interface, treatment suitable for the process, access, utilities and an agreed commissioning sequence. Record who provides each element. A telephone number and an assumed available compressor are insufficient evidence that the process can be restored within its recovery objective.
Where availability is commercially dependent, record the actual arrangement and its limitations. Do not infer stock, response time or geographic coverage from general marketing language. A mobilisation estimate should include access restrictions, transport, unloading, positioning, connection, inspection, startup and service verification as applicable to the site.
Verify that the temporary route supports the required failure scenario. An electric rental package may be unsuitable as the sole contingency for loss of the site's electrical supply. A diesel package introduces other site requirements. These are engineering and logistical conditions to resolve during planning rather than discoveries to make during an outage.
21 Connect the decision to maintenance and spare parts
Criticality should influence inspection priorities, intervention timing, job preparation and spare-parts strategy. It does not mean that every component associated with a critical process must be stocked. Some failures have effective alternate service; others have long restoration paths despite a spare being available.
The spares worksheet then considers demand exposure, lead time, compatibility, preservation and repair options. A low-cost component can deserve priority when its absence disables a protected function. An expensive component may not require local stock if a verified recovery arrangement meets the service requirement.
Maintenance readiness includes more than materials. Record drawings, settings, tools, lifting arrangements, competent personnel and the isolation method needed for the expected task. If the plan depends on a special procedure or an external specialist, that dependency belongs in the recovery estimate and the action register.
22 Design monitoring around decisions
Choose monitored variables because they detect a relevant service loss or provide useful intervention time. Critical-point pressure, delivered flow, moisture condition, treatment differential pressure and machine availability can serve different purposes. A long list of sensors does not automatically produce an effective response.
For each alarm, specify the meaning, responsible recipient, response action and available time. Confirm that the alarm reaches someone able to act during the operating period. An alarm delivered to an unattended mailbox offers little protection for a rapid event. Escalation should include loss of the monitoring system itself where that loss affects the service plan.
Separate condition indicators from acceptance measurements. A rising differential pressure may prompt maintenance before a restriction affects the process. It does not directly establish the remaining air-quality performance of a filter. Record what an indicator can support and which conclusions require additional evidence.
23 Worked case A with a weighted score and a dominant issue
This example uses invented planning inputs solely to demonstrate the method. A packaging line is assigned scores of 4 for production disruption, 3 for product exposure, 4 for financial effect and 3 for recovery complexity. The site chooses weights of 3, 2, 2 and 1 respectively. The weighted total is 4 × 3 + 3 × 2 + 4 × 2 + 3 × 1 = 29. The weight sum is 8, giving a screening score of 3.625, displayed as 3.63.
The arithmetic does not supply a class boundary. If the local approved scheme maps that result to a high-priority class, the record must include the scheme version. If no scheme exists, retain the score and describe the consequence without inventing a threshold. The next decision is which service conditions protect the line and whether the present arrangement meets them.
Now suppose the same review identifies a valve function whose loss has an unresolved severe consequence. That issue is recorded as an escalation and requires the responsible assessment. It is not reduced by changing the financial weight or averaging in low-consequence workshop loads. The score remains reproducible, while the unresolved issue remains visible.
24 Worked case B with a capacity deficit and load shedding
For this illustrative scenario, surviving compressors can supply 11.0 m3/min on a stated common reference basis upstream of treatment. The treatment train consumes 0.6 m3/min on the same basis, and other documented contingency demand is 0.2 m3/min. Usable delivery for the scheduled critical consumers is therefore 10.2 m3/min. The consumer schedule totals 10.8 m3/min, leaving a deficit of 0.6 m3/min.
An approved reduction removes a nonessential 0.9 m3/min demand that was included in the consumer schedule. Revised demand is 9.9 m3/min, producing a positive flow margin of 0.3 m3/min. That result depends on the shedding action occurring before the protected pressure falls below its minimum. It also depends on the stated capacity and treatment consumption being valid at the event conditions.
The appropriate output is a conditional flow conclusion, not a complete service pass. Pressure, quality and transfer time require separate evidence. If the flow meter is downstream of treatment and already reads 10.2 m3/min delivered, subtracting the 0.6 m3/min again would be incorrect. The worksheet must preserve the boundary used in the calculation.
25 Worked case C with a short receiver bridge
Assume, for an illustrative screening calculation, a receiver volume of 2.0 m3, an available pressure interval from 8.0 to 7.0 bar absolute, a reference pressure of 1.0 bar absolute, and equal receiver and reference temperatures. The ideal isothermal usable reference volume is 2.0 × (8.0 minus 7.0) / 1.0 = 2.0 m3. With a constant net reference-flow deficit of 4.0 m3/min, the estimated bridge is 0.5 minutes, or 30 seconds.
If the validated transfer sequence takes 45 seconds, this simplified calculation does not support continuity through the transfer. Possible responses include reducing the deficit, shortening the transfer, changing the validated storage arrangement, or accepting a different process state where permitted. The calculation does not justify increasing a pressure setting without checking equipment limits and the complete pressure budget.
The example assumes that the pressure floor is sufficient at the consumer and that the reference basis is consistent. It omits cooling during discharge and dynamic restrictions. A field acceptance test under the approved procedure must establish whether the intended process function remains available during the actual transition.
26 Worked case D with recovery milestones
An illustrative plant allows 90 minutes from detection to restoration of an accepted air service. The proposed recovery sequence allocates 10 minutes for diagnosis, 35 minutes for delivery after diagnosis, 20 minutes for connection after delivery and 15 minutes for verification after connection. If these stages are sequential, the estimated restoration time is 80 minutes, leaving 10 minutes before the tolerable interruption is reached.
A required site-entry clearance adds 25 minutes. If clearance can run in parallel with the 35-minute delivery stage, it does not extend the calculated critical sequence. If clearance starts only when the equipment arrives and blocks connection, restoration becomes 105 minutes. The same list of task durations therefore produces different results depending on the actual dependencies.
The ten-minute apparent allowance in the first sequence is not an established reliability margin. Duration uncertainty, transport conditions and failed acceptance can consume it. The worksheet should record the evidence for the timeline and the consequence if the objective is missed. None of these illustrative durations is a Reddy Compressors service commitment.
27 Worked case E with quality failure despite spare compression
A hypothetical station has enough compressor capacity after one unit fails. Both the duty and standby machines feed a single dryer. The critical process requires a defined moisture condition, and no qualified alternate dryer path exists. During dryer failure, pressure and flow remain available but the moisture requirement cannot be demonstrated.
The service conclusion is that the defined quality-dependent function is not supported in that scenario. Calling the station redundant because of spare compression would conceal the actual limitation. The corrective review can compare standby treatment, a qualified temporary treatment package, process isolation or another approved response.
The review must also consider downstream exposure. If wet air has entered the system, restarting a repaired dryer may not immediately remove water already present in piping or equipment. The process owner should define sampling, recovery and product disposition.
28 Worked case F with a low consequence workshop
A hypothetical maintenance workshop uses intermittent air tools and has an accepted alternative work method. Loss of air delays selected jobs, but operations confirms that the protected production and shutdown functions do not depend on that workshop branch. The site records a low consequence classification with the alternative method and its limitations.
The decision may favour planned repair, compatible common spares and a practical temporary connection instead of dedicated standby compression. This is a reasoned service decision when the interruption is acceptable. It should be revisited if the workshop begins maintaining a production-critical component whose delay changes the business consequence.
The example shows why the same equipment can require a different service strategy after a process change. Criticality is attached to the supported function and operating context. The equipment label alone is insufficient. The worksheet revision should record the changed dependency and the decision owner.
29 Diagnose contradictory results before changing equipment
When a capacity calculation shows surplus but the process loses pressure, first verify measurement boundaries, demand timing and the installed route. A restriction, regulator behaviour or delayed load shedding can explain the event without a shortage in total compressor capacity. Synchronized trends are more informative than unrelated readings taken at different times.
When service restoration is repeatedly late despite stocked parts, examine diagnosis time, compatibility checks, access, isolation and acceptance. Buying another copy of the same spare may leave the dominant delay unchanged. When alarms show no problem but production reports interruptions, check sensor location, recording interval and whether the alarm threshold represents the process requirement.
Observed mismatch | Likely investigation path | Evidence to obtain |
|---|---|---|
Positive flow margin but low consumer pressure | Distribution loss or unresolved transient | Synchronized pressure and demand traces |
Spare compressor starts but process remains stopped | Quality, controls or restart dependency | Event sequence and release records |
Recovery misses its objective | Unmodelled serial task or uncertain duration | Timed recovery record |
Scores vary greatly between reviewers | Unclear scale or different scenario | Rationale comparison and agreed anchors |
Low score with severe consequence | Average conceals overriding issue | Separate escalation and owner decision |
Apparent standby is unavailable during maintenance | Configuration and isolation dependency | Current drawings and maintenance state review |
30 Use the required scoring worksheet
The following record is the required Criticality scoring worksheet with decision rationale. Create a separate instance for each process function and material failure scenario. Blank fields remain unknown; they must not silently become zero, low criticality or a pass. The printable record and the future digital implementation should use the same field definitions.
Worksheet field | Entry required | Review rule |
|---|---|---|
Record identity | Process, connection, scenario, revision and owner | Unique and traceable |
Function and operating state | Required process action and event state | Agreed by operations |
Consequence criteria | Score, local definition, rationale and evidence for each | No unexplained score |
Weights and score | Disclosed weights and reproducible result | Positive total weight |
Overriding issue | Severe consequence, owner and disposition | Cannot be averaged away |
Service requirement | Flow basis, pressure location, quality and duration | Measurable at the boundary |
Interruption and recovery | Defined clocks, objectives and task sequence | Dependencies stated |
Critical demand | Retained loads and executable shedding | Event simultaneity addressed |
Firm capacity | Usable surviving supply and calculation boundary | Site conditions verified |
Common dependencies | Shared utilities and maintenance states | Scenario review complete |
Decision | Selected strategy and rejected options with reasons | Evidence and limitations visible |
Actions and approval | Owner, due date, closure evidence and sign-off | No automatic closure |
31 Add a service acceptance record
For each service property, record the requirement, test condition, measurement method, instrument identification, result and disposition. Include the transfer event and the restart state if they determine the service need. A document review can verify the plan; it cannot substitute for an actual performance test where the conclusion depends on installed behaviour.
The acceptance procedure should be approved through the site's normal engineering and operational process. It must address the consequences of an unsuccessful test and the restoration path.
Close a gap only when its evidence is available. An ordered spare, planned alarm or proposed alternate dryer remains an action until installed, checked and incorporated into the operating arrangement. Preserve the previous status and the closure date so later reviewers can distinguish the intended architecture from the architecture that actually existed at the time of an event.
32 Maintain the worksheet through changes
Review the record when demand changes, a new consumer is connected, controls are modified, treatment is replaced, a recovery agreement changes or an incident exposes an incorrect assumption. A calendar review can be useful, but event-driven review is necessary when the service basis changes between scheduled reviews.
Retain the prior revision and explain the changed decision. If a criticality class changes, identify whether the consequence changed, the local scale changed or new evidence corrected an earlier judgment. Otherwise the trend can be mistaken for improving reliability when only the scoring convention has changed.
Use the completed record in maintenance planning, capital review and incident learning. Repeated failures to achieve a recovery objective are evidence that the service strategy needs revision. A successful test is useful evidence for its tested conditions; it does not prove performance under every untested common-cause scenario.
33 Frequently asked questions
Does a high criticality score mean a larger compressor is required
No single equipment decision follows from the score. The review may identify a treatment gap, an inaccessible isolation, a shared power dependency or a slow recovery step. The chosen measure should address the failure scenario and service property that create the consequence. Additional compression is appropriate only when it resolves the documented requirement.
Can a supplier response commitment prove plant continuity
A response commitment covers the milestones and conditions stated in the actual agreement. Plant continuity also depends on the time before an unacceptable consequence, the equipment and access needed for restoration, and verification at the consumer. Compare the complete recovery sequence with the process requirement rather than equating acknowledgement or arrival with restored service.
Can the same worksheet cover several production lines
A summary can compare several lines, but each materially different function needs its own consequence and service record. Combining lines is reasonable only when their operating states, supply boundary and failure consequences are sufficiently similar and the grouping does not conceal a protected load or a different quality requirement.
Is a high numerical availability target enough
An availability target does not describe the permitted duration of a single interruption, the failure mode or the quality condition during service. Two arrangements can have a similar annual availability estimate while creating very different process consequences. State the required service envelope and event-level recovery requirements alongside any availability objective.
Can receiver storage eliminate a contingency compressor
Storage can support a finite interval when its usable inventory covers the net demand deficit above the required pressure floor. Whether that interval is sufficient depends on the transfer or shutdown sequence. It cannot replace continuous supply during an indefinite outage. Use a consistent flow reference basis and verify the installed transient.
What if reliable failure history is unavailable
Record the consequence and service requirement using the process evidence that is available. Keep likelihood uncertain rather than inventing a failure rate. Compare options through explicit scenarios and sensitivity analysis, and identify the operating records needed to improve the decision. Lack of failure history does not mean that a failure is impossible.